With the introduction of new regulations and sustainable technologies, revamping and upgrading already existing chemical plants is nowadays an important element in the framework of process engineering. Such important modifications must come along in parallel improvement of process safety. In this sense, risk assessment is a tool that should be versatile and easy to update by definition. However, even the most common methods currently used for accidental scenarios identification and risk assessment estimation (such as HazOp) may prove to be very time-consuming when discussing about safety from process modifications. The availability of a reliable and easy-to-update tool for safety engineering is crucial for process industries. In this work, we compare a risk analysis on a chemical plant subject of modifications performed with two different tools: HazOp and FTA vs Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA) and FTA. Both techniques have been applied to a tank dedicated to dust mixing that was subject of process modifications. Both methods come to the same conclusions, highlighting new failures and process criticalities, associated with the introduction of flow alarms and interlocks in case of excessive depressurizing. It is shown that the Recursive Operability Analysis, with its cause-consequence structure tied with process variable interactions, is much more effective in a risk assessment update.