Manzi A., Iaiani M., Tugnoli A., Antonioni G., Cozzani V., 2026, A Digital Twin–based Approach Supporting the Calculation of Cyber-Attack Success Probability in Process Plants, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 126, 313-318.
The implementation of Basic Process Control Systems (BPCS) and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in the chemical and process industry has brought significant advantages in terms of safety and operational efficiency. However, this dependency from digitalized systems exposes process plants to cyber-attacks that may disrupt production or initiate major accidents (e.g., releases of hazardous substances). In this context, cyber quantitative risk assessment (cyber QRA) provides a framework to identify and quantify cyber risks related to BPCS and SIS malicious manipulation. However, its application requires the estimation of key variables. In particular, the probability of cyber-attack success represents one of the most challenging parameters to determine, as it depends on detailed knowledge of the system’s dynamic response to malicious manipulations. Such information is highly specific to the facility under analysis and is difficult to retrieve. To address this gap, this study proposes a Digital Twin–based approach to simulate cyber-attack scenarios and retrieve the data required for estimating the probability of attack success. The approach is demonstrated on a specific scenario involving the intentional shutdown of the cooling system of an electrolyzer module.
